It is often claimedt hatc ertain remarks by Wittgenstein reveal him to have been an unsympathetic readero fS hakespeare anda n unappreciativejudge of the latter's achievements.Inthe present paper, Ia ttempt to show that thiss ort of observation is noto nly wrongb ut due to an inadequatep erspective. An examination of the relevant remarks mayb ring to lightan umbero fm oreo rl ess interesting principles of evaluation,o raesthetic maxims andappraisals,b ut these do not saymuchabout Shakespeare'sworks,nor aretheymeant to be instructive in this way. What Wittgenstein's remarksare reallyaboutis his own intellectual physiognomy: it is by wayo fc ontrast, by comparingc ertain features of Shakespeare with what he supposest o be characteristic of himself, that he hopestolearn about the limitsand potentialitiesofhis ownpersonality.
I. Twoquestions
Therei sas trange tradition of misunderstanding Wittgenstein's remarkso nS hakespeare. This tradition is exemplified by observations like RayM onk's statementt hat "Wittgensteinh ad long been troubledb yh is inabilityt oa ppreciatet he greatnesso f Shakespeare" (1991: 568) 1 ,o rG eorgeS teiner's claimt hat Further misunderstandings can be found on this and the following pageofMonk's book. stein, in spiteo fb eing" ag reat logiciana nd epistemologist",c ould be "a blind reader of literature"-and of Shakespeare, in particular. 2 Quiteapart from theobvious factthat Wittgensteinwas neithera" great logician" nora n" epistemologist" of anys tripeo r stature whatsoever, he would surely have mindedb eingc alleda "blind reader of literature". And what we knowa bout his comments on literary works surely does notj ustifyajudgemento f the kindpronounced by Steiner. In twor ecent articles, WolfgangH uemerh as made al audable attempt at identifying thesea nd other misunderstandingso f Wittgenstein'sr elevant remarksa nd pointing out some respects in which they canbefound to be erroneousand misleading. 3 Muchof whatH uemer says seems correct enough, butIcontinuet of eel that he has not arrived at theheart of the matter. In my view,what we arel ackinga re (1) ac leara wareness of the type of remark we aredealing withand (2) the true point,orpoints, of theseremarks. As regards (1), we need information andasmuch clarityaspossible aboutt he manuscript contexto ft hism aterial, anda sr egards (2), we shall need to find plausiblea nswers to questions about why Wittgenstein wrote these lines:w hat was he drivinga t, andw hom washeaddressing?
One reason fora skingq uestion (1)i st he impression that in speaking of "Wittgenstein's remarks on Shakespeare" too much unity of form andp urposei st aken for granted.B yl umping the relevant remarks together under the heading "On Shakespeare" we arebeingtold that we shouldlookatthis material in acertain light. And consequently, the question whetherW ittgensteing ot Shakespearer ight may seem an atural one to ask.I nt hisp aper, it will become cleart hat Ih ave my doubts about the correctness of 2 Steiner (1996) , quoted in Huemer (2012: 230) .A ccordingt oa nother quotation from Steiner'sp iece Wittgenstein objected to Shakespearef or ther eason thatt he latter failst o do thetruepoet's job of being "a truth-sayer, an explicitly moral agent,avisible teacher to andg uardian of imperilled, bewildered mankind" ( Huemer 2012: 231) . Cf. Huemer (forthcoming) . 3 BesidesS teiner's striking views, Huemer also discussesa na rticle by Peter Lewis (2005) . Even though some of Lewis's observations are quite interesting in themselves,Ia gree with Huemer that anumber of things he says rest on misunderstandings of the bearing of Wittgenstein'sremarks. an approach of this kind. And these doubts carry over to the questionabout Wittgenstein'spoint in dealing with Shakespeare. In fact, this secondset of doubtswill prove even more important than the first lot. Evidently, most commentators have failedt oa sk this central question,and this failure is one, or perhaps thechief,reason for many unhelpful answers to question(1).
Butd espitem yf eeling thatt he answers we tend to givet o question (1) will to some extent dependonthe answers we tend to give to question (2), Is hall proceed by wayo ff irstl ooking at the text of the relevant remarksa sw ella s( someo f) their context and leaving thediscussion of Wittgenstein'sultimatepoint,orpoints, in writingt hese notest oal ater part of this paper.H owever, before getting down to my fairly systematic examinationofthe text,Ishall very brieflym ention anotherq uestion (ifo nlyt ol eave it aside, thoughw ith ag oodc onscience) ands ay af ew things about the published version of Wittgenstein's remarks.
II.Wittgenstein's Shakespeare
Theq uestionIw antt or aise (if only to leave it alone after af ew desultorys uggestions)c oncerns Wittgenstein'sf amiliarityw ith Shakespeare's works. If this is meanta saquestion requiring an answer in terms of evidence forh is having read or attended a performanceo fo ne of Shakespeare's plays, it is quickly answered. Therei se videncef or his acquaintance with King Lear,b ut this seemstobeall. 4 So,people may cometowonderwhy Wittgenstein daredt om akes weepingj udgements about Shakespeare on the basis of havingr ead, or attended onep erformanceo f, ones ingle play.B ut this is ac ompletelym isguidedw ay of looking at the matter. It used to be the case -and this is particularly true of the second half of the nineteenth andt he first half of thet wentieth 4 Seet he reports of Wittgenstein's responset oaperformanceo fK ing Lear in Rhees (1984: 73, 118 Lessing, "17. Literaturbrief" (1759) ; Hamburgische Dramaturgie (1767-69); Herder, "Shakespeare" (1773); Goethe, "Zum Shakespeares-Tag" (1773); "Shakespeare und kein Ende" (1815/1826); cf. Dichtung undW ahrheit,P artI II, Bk. 11; WilhelmM eistersL ehrjahre, Part III, ch.8; Heine, Romantische Schule (1835[6] ), Bk.I (Heine 1978: 375 choices reflecthis own time andhis own interests (as he wouldhavebeenthe first to acknowledge). Second, no book of this kindc an provide as ubstitutef or actuallyr eading these remarksintheir original manuscript context. Pichler's revised editionc ontributes to reminding us of thisf actb yr eproducing certain featureso ft he originala nd giving exact references to the manuscripts.This is helpful,but unfortunately readerskeeptreating the book as if it were authorizedbyWittgensteinh imself. It is not, of this material wasfirstpublishedin1930 and1934-35, but some of it was used as early as 1916). On Karl Kraus's public readings, see Canetti (1980) ; his Shakespeare readings are mentioned on p. 73. 8 References will be to theu sualB lackwelle ditionso fW ittgenstein's works, using the abbreviations mentioned in the list of references. and in many cases the published remarks canc ontribute to our knowledge of Wittgensteinonly if this fact is appreciated.
The following quotations are (sometimes slightlyn ormalized) versionso ft he text presented in Culture and Value.I ns omec ases whereIwish to stress the possibility of an alternative readingofthe Germano riginal notc apturedb yWinch's translation,Ishall tryt o bring thisout by paraphrasing thetextaccordingly or,occasionally, by explicitly suggesting such areading.
Dance
The first quotationc omesf rom as mallish notebookc ontaining remarksfrom1940 (MS 162b Thefirstpoint to be noted about thisquotation(MS 162b: 61r;CV: 42)i st hat it does nots eem to stand in anyo bvious connectiont o any of the otherr elevant remarks. Thes econd significantp oint is this:t hat Wittgenstein finds it importantt or emindh imself of the factthat he owesthisinsight to Engelmann. In away,thishelps to underline thep ersonal, or private, character of ther emark:i ti si n the natureofakeepsake and,likethe dried flowers he usedtokeep in hismanuscripts, meant to remind him of exchanges with his old friend. The objectivity alluded to is reminiscent of that mentioned in am uch earlier( 1931) remark apropos of Karl Kraus, 9 where Wittgenstein observest hat the latter'sp layss hould be performed by actorsw earing masks (CV: 14) . This wouldh elpt ob ringo ut thatt he characters are "stylizedh uman beings".S o, thei ntended objectivity is producedbyakind of Verfremdungseffekt.The passions would be made visible in an highly artificial way, in the styleo fa balletr epresenting, for instance,the cardinalvirtues or mortal sins. Accordingly, we mayn ow, in spiteo fo ur first impression, tryt o find ac onnection betweenW ittgenstein's claim thatS hakespeare does nots how the passions in an aturalistic way andh is later statement (CV: 96) that Shakespeareisnot "truetolife" (naturwahr). It is notc leart om ew hy Winch chose to translatet he first two occurrences of "zeigen"b y" display"a nd the third one by "show". It mayw ellb et hatW ittgenstein's "zeigen"i sm eant to have the force of "having thep assions performed, enacted,m adev isible". This would fit thee mphasiso no bjectivity,s tylizationa nd Verfremdung.
It is intriguing that thisi deao fad ance of human passions is mentionedafew lines after anotherremark centring on the notion of ad ance and comparing piano playing to "a dance of human fingers".
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It is not clear what exactlyW ittgenstein had in mind here, but if he thought of something likeC hicoM arx'sf ilm performances,w here thef ingers could be said to play as eparate, visually appreciable,r oleq uite independent of their function as producers of certain sounds, it mayw ellb et hat it was this abstractness or stylization which madeh im think of Engelmann's remark. 9 As amatteroffact, the remark begins in amoregeneral waybyspeakingofthe presentday possibilityofhaving akind of theatreofthe stylized or objectified or "abstract" kind alluded to.K raus is thenm entioned as as pecial case, buti nv iewo fE ngelmann's particularly close relation to Kraus it mayb ea ppropriate to emphasize the connection with hiswork. 10 In CV, this remark immediately precedes theq uoted oneo nS hakespeare; in the manuscript, there are two short remarks separating them.
Milton's testimony
Our next remark doesn ot seem to presentu sw ith anyd ifficulties of interpretation. It was writteni nA ugust1 946 andc an be found in thes econd of hisl arge accountb ooks,g enerally referredt oa s " Bände", formingaseries of manuscripts chiefly dealing with the philosophy of psychology ( MS 131: 46,1 5.8.1946 ).I nt he margin, this observationismarkedas"S" (= schlecht =bad),which means thatu pon re-readingt his materialW ittgenstein decided against using it again; that is, he decidedthat he wouldnot includeitinhis typescript(TS 229 =RPP I). Here, the caseo fS hakespearei sa dduced as an example of the difficulty mentioned at the beginning of this remark. The immediatem anuscriptc ontext does not containacluet ow hy Wittgenstein shouldf eel motivatedt os ay something about Shakespeare's admirers or aboutt he role of Milton.Asfar as Ican see, nothing is knowna bout the specific text by,o ra bout,M ilton thatm ay have inspired Wittgenstein to this (part of his) remark.
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As this is the only occurrenceo fM ilton's namei nt he whole corpus of Wittgenstein'swritings, we cannottell why hisopinion of Milton was high enough to convince himt hat Shakespeare should be regardedasanauthor deservinggreatpraise. Wittgenstein'sview thatmostpeople, includingprofessors of literature,tend to have no good reasons of their own for praisingXwhile condemningYis surely true buto fc oursee ntirelyu noriginal.I nv iew of the numerous misunderstandings mentionedinthe introductory partof this paperitm ay be worth noting that the quoted remark doesn ot contain anything that couldb er eada sa na ttempta td isparaging Shakespeare: it merely states thatt oW ittgenstein himselfi td oes not comen aturally to see Shakespeare as an absolutely admirable poet. Therewillbemore about this factinlater remarks,but at this pointw em ay note that, for onet hing,W ittgensteind oesn ot say anythingd ismissive about Shakespeare and, for another,a ccepts Milton's testimonya ss ufficientt om akeh im agreet hat Shakespeare's reputationiswell-founded.
Similes
Ourt hird quotationc omprisesf ourp aragraphs. The first three belong together; thef ourth is separated from the rest by ab lank line. The text comes from MS 131( p. 163, 31.8.1946 ) anda fter some remarks on meaning-blindness (RPP I §344);itisfollowedby related observations( § §345e tc.). Threer emarks on similart hemes have been markeda sschlecht,a nd ab rief personal remark in code does nots eem to be connected with any of the other materialo n the page. After this lineincodeWittgensteinproceeds by saying:
[a]Die Gleichnisse Shakespeares sind, im gewöhnlichenSinne,schlecht. Sind sie also dennoch gut -und ob sie es sind, weiß ichnicht -,so Wittgenstein himselfw as proud of hisa bility to produce striking andh elpfuls imiles. Probablyh ew ould say that -" in the ordinary sense"-his own similes aregood. In his view, theyare at any rate very differenti nk ind from Shakespeare's similes. This discussion, of course, presupposes that it is appropriate to generalizea bout these similes; butt his is ap resupposition which Wittgenstein does not attempttojustify.
12
He admits that, in spite of his own doubts, he cannot exclude the possibility that these similes will be considered good ones. But if so,t hism ust be in virtue of their being "a law unto themselves". This is an idea which will comeu p again (see below, § 4), butt here the context is different. Here, it is not quitec lear in which wayt heir "ring" can redeem them,t hat is, turnt hemi ntos omethingp robableo re ven true. Wittgenstein cannot mean the mere sound of thew ords concerned. Maybe he wants to sayt hat in their specific situations of utterance (as opposed to being considered outofcontext) they could be heard as "truths".
Anothertheme of these reflections is theimpression thatf or us to be able to admireS hakespeare we shall have to regard him as a kind of elemental force: somethingthatwehave to resignourselves to in the samew ay in which we acceptn ature and itsp henomena. We shoulds ee hisw orks as effortlessp roducts of ab eing who creates these playsinamoodofsplendid indifference, 13 as if it were just child's play.( This is related to Schiller's famous characterization of the "naive"p oet -we shallc ome back to this.) Accordinglyi ts eemst hat what Wittgensteins ays in paragraph [ab] amounts to this: (1) that it is Shakespeare's entire output which makes it possiblefor us to discern the landscapeand itsoutlines, its style, which (2)inits turnisaprecondition forrecognizingthe law behind it,v iz.w hat" provides the justification" (cf. §4.a andm y discussion of this).
But if thisi sr ight, then an adequater esponse to Shakespeare's works will presuppose the abilityt os ee them as ak indo f landscape, aproductoraforce of nature.A nd this involves seeing them with an effortlessness, ak indo fa cceptance, which corresponds to the effortlessness,o rs pontaneity, 14 with which these workswerecomposed. If, likeWittgenstein,you find yourself unable to respond to them in this way, your inability mayh elpt o explain whyyou find it hardtomakesense of theseworks (for this difficulty to make sense, cf. below § §5.b and 7.a).
Dream narratives
The manuscript source of the fourth remark( MS 168; CV: 89)i s quite striking. Them anuscript consists of twelvep ages in Witt-genstein's best handwriting;t he binding is ornamental and reminiscent of the kind of book youngp eople of ac ertain age wouldu se as diaries. Virtually allt he remarks contained in it are copiedfrom manuscripts136 or 137,and practically all of themcan be foundinCulture and Value.There areo ccasional dates indicating when the remarksw ere noted down in oneo ft he two Bände just mentioned. Roughly speaking, the orderisJanuary1949, May1948, November1 948, December 1947. If there area ny scholarly discussions of the material, visible sideofthis manuscript,Iam not aware of theirexistence. Thew hole book looks ab it likeakind of offering, perhaps ap resent to af riend or ar elative.T he only remarksnot obviously copied from earlier manuscripts arethe first two (dated "16.1.49" and" 1.49", respectively). Thef ineq ualityo f the handwriting, however,s uggests that these remarks too were copied from an earlier source; so,j ust as in thec ase of the other remarksc ontained in manuscript 168, thed ates given may not coincide withthe date of copying thesetwo observations. Both of them concern "dreams". The first one (CV: 88-9) deals with topicsd iscussed in several places in the context of Wittgenstein's reflectionso nq uestions in the philosophy of psychology (cf. PPF § §52-3,320). Thesecond one, which mentions Shakespeare, mayr emind readerso fc ertain things Wittgenstein says about aFreudian analysis of dreams: the dreamaschanging its sensecompletely, as performed on astage,astorni ntolittlepieces and re-composed in anew order, etc. (see CV: 78). Oneo ft he themesm entionedi nt hisp assage has cropped up before. This is thei deat hat Shakespeare's plays aren ot (meant as) representations of reality; theya re notr ealistic, not "naturalistic", not" true to life" (naturwahr). Here, this idea is expressedm ore strongly by comparing Shakespeare'sp rocedurew ith thato fa dream: in ad ream, certain elementso fw hat happened during the dayorofastorytold or read will be selectedand puttogether in a completely newf ashion, often in af ashion which seems paradoxical or absurd. But as we have always known, there may be modes of rearranging these dream materials in such aw ay that a previously unfamiliars ensee merges.P ossibly, Shakespeare's method is ab it like this, andh is playsw illo ffer an ew sensei fw e find the key, theunknown law,inaccordance withwhich the pieces of the puzzle have beena ssembled.T his notion of Shakespeare's Eigengesetzlichkeit,his being alaw unto himself, has been mentioned before ( §3.a). Butnow it can be seen in anew lightasderived from reflections on the supposedly paradoxical or absurd character of his plays.
At hird point is developed from the previous two: if Shakespeare'splayscan, in spite of their absurdity,justifiably be regarded as great,t hen thisw illb ed ue to their workinga ccording to an highly individuall aw finding expressioni nalanguage andaworld all itso wn. Ands uch al anguage, such aw orld (that is,aworld peopled with charactersw ea re not, or not at first glance, familiar with), can only be understood if theevidenceonthe basis of which we try to interpret the languagea nd figure out thew orldi s sufficient for us to succeed.H ence,t he miracleo fm aking the author'sg reatness intelligiblec an onlyb ew orked through the bulk of hiso utput: we simply need as ufficienta mount of evidence to arrive at thelaw allowing us to read him.
Creator vs.poet
Our fifth quotation( CV: 95-6)i sas equenceo fr eflectionso n Shakespeareo r, perhaps, on Wittgenstein's( lack ofa )r elationship with Shakespeare.T his sequence is takenf rom MS 173; in its manuscript context it canb ef oundb etween two remarkso nt he middle of p. 63 of LW II. Our sequence is separated fromt he rest by vertical strokesa tt he beginninga nd the endo fe achi ndividual remarkf orming thes equence. This is ad evice Wittgenstein sometimes used to indicate thath ec onsideredacertain remark as not forming part of the rest.The sequence runsasfollows:
[a]Ich glaube nicht,daß man Shakespearemit einem andern Dichter zusammenhalten kann.
Idonot thinkthatShakespearecan be setalongside anyother poet.
[aa] Warernicht eher ein Sprachschöpfer alsein Dichter?
Washeperhaps a creator of language rather than apoet?
[b]Ich könnteShakespearenur anstaunen; nieetwas mitihm anfangen.
Icould only stare in wonderat Shakespeare; neverdoanything with him.
[ [e] "Dasgroße Herz Beethovens" -niemandkönntesagen "das große Herz Shakespeares".'Diegelenke Hand, die neueNaturformen der Sprachegeschaffen hat' schiene mir richtiger.
"Beethoven's greatheart" -no one couldsay "Shakespeare's great heart".'Thesupple hand that created new natural forms of language' wouldseemtomenearer themark.
[f]Der Dichter kann eigentlich nicht vonsichsagen "Ich singe, wie der Vogelsingt" -aber S. hättees vielleicht vonsichsagen können.
The poet cannotreally say of himself "I sing as thebird sings"-butperhaps S. could have said it of himself.
Besides severali deas we have encountered before, this sequence contains an umber of new thoughts. In paragraph [c]W ittgenstein repeats thath ed oesn ot trust thej udgement of most admirers of Shakespeare(cf. §2,above). What is new is his explicit diagnosis of the reason why,i nh is view, people tend to form unreliable judgements about Shakespeare. It is thel atter's uniqueness, the singularityo fh is talent andh is procedure, which is at theb ottom of akind of incommensurability:itisvirtually impossible to classify him, and hence virtually impossible to classifyhim correctly [a] . Of course, this uniqueness is directly connectedw ithh is outstanding originality in using language (a creatoro flanguage [aa]) 17 and the fact 17 The adjective "sprachschöpferisch"i sn ot extremelyu ncommon in German andd oes not signify morethanlinguistic inventivenessorresourceful, imaginativemastery of language. Wittgenstein's noun is probably derived fromt he adjectival useo ft he word, so it should thatW ittgenstein feels thath ec annot engage with him; he could only be amazed at hiscreativity [b] . Anotherpoint thati srepeatedherei sthe claimthat, by normal standards,S hakespeare's portraits are not particularly good oneshe is not true to life ([d] , cf. §3.a).But,aswehaveseen, even if his portraitsseem wrong,hemanages to "make an impression":itisin virtue of the individualityo fh is brushs trokest hat hisc haracters look significant. This is takenu pi np aragraph [e] , where Shakespeare's" supple hand"i sp raiseda nd contrasted with Beethoven's "great heart",aswell as in the last paragraph [f] , where it is claimedt hat, whereas at ruep oetc annotr eallys ay of himself what the minstrel, or bard, in Goethe's poem says: "I singa st he birds ings", 18 Shakespeare might have been in ap osition to say it. This, Is uppose, is the force of the expression "Naturformend er Sprache": it is by giving vent to his ownn ature that he succeeds in creating forms that ared ifferent from everything else without appearing artificial or contrived.
Whati sr eally remarkable aboutW ittgenstein'so bservations is notw hat he says in his effort to characterizeS hakespeare andt he individuality of hisw orkmanship; it is what he implies by using certain contrastsa nd pointing out that one would notw ant to ascribet oh im Beethoven's "great heart"w hereas one could imagine that Shakespeare would want to say of himself what true, or more normal,poets would not wanttoclaim,viz. that their lines are,asi twere, an instinctive expressionoftheirown nature.These two contrasts seem to me to stand in need of explanation, and I hope that ther esto ft his papera nd especiallyi ts concluding part will castsome lightonwhat Wittgenstein may have hadinmind.
not be taken to imply superhuman powers.W hati sr emarkable is the contrast between Sprachschöpfer and Dichter -acontrast which may be connected with Wittgenstein's respect for existing rules and conventions as discussedinthe penultimate paragraph of thispaper, on the oneh and, andh is conceptiono ft he philosophera saw riter of poetry, on the other. Forthislast aspect, seeSchulte (2013a). 18 Here,Wittgenstein quotesaline from Goethe's ballad "Der Sänger". If looked at from the pointo fv iew elaborated by Wittgenstein,t he scene described andt he words used in Goethe's poem anticipate agood deal of theconflict between Walther v. Stolzing's way of singing and Beckmesser's criticism of it as presented in the firstact of Meistersinger.
Thepoet'slot
Our sixth quotation( CV: 96), liket he previous one, comes from a manuscript (MS 173)mostly containingremarks on colour(our text is enclosedb etween ROCI II § §253a nd 254),a nd again its individual paragraphs are markedbyverticalstrokes as notforming part of their immediate context.
[a]Ich glaube nicht,daß Shakespeare überdas 'Dichterlos'hätte nachdenkenkönnen.
Idonot thinkShakespearecould have reflectedonthe 'lot of the poet'.
[b] Er konnte sichauchnicht selbst alsProphetoderLehrerder Menschenbetrachten.
[ba] Die Menschen staunen ihnan beinahe wieein Naturschauspiel.Sie fühlennicht,daß sie dadurch mit einem großen Menschen in Berührung kommen. Sondern mit einem Phänomen.
Neithercould he regard himselfasa prophet or teacherofhumanity.
People regardhim with amazement almost as aspectacle of nature.They do nothavethe feelingthatthis brings them into contact withagreat humanbeing.Rather with a phenomenon.
[c] Ichglaube,umeinen Dichter zu genießen, dazu mußman auch die Kultur, zu der er gehört, gern haben. Istdie einem gleichgültig oder zuwider,soerkaltetdie Bewunderung.
Ithink that,inorder to enjoyapoet, youhavetolikethe culturetowhich he belongs as well.Ifyou are indifferent to this or repelledbyit, your admiration cools off.
Whileour previoussequenceended with aquotation fromGoethe, ourp resent setb egins with an allusion to as hort poem by Eichendorff ("Dichterlos").Itisalamentinthe first person,and the speaker is ap oetw ho protestst hat,t houghh aving to carry the burden of feeling allt he passions on other( ordinary) people's behalf,h ew illn ot live to see thef ruit borneb yh is own achievements.O fc ourse, this is as tandard kind of complaint associatedw itht he typicalf igure of the" romantic poet", andi ti s surelyt ruet hat thec onflictb etween thea ims of ordinaryc itizens and the ideals pursuedb yt he poet playedagreat role, noto nlyi n the imagination, buta lso in ther ealt houghts of writers and intellectuals of the romantic andp ostromantic periods. Wittgenstein's claim is that thisk indo fr eflection wouldn ot have occurredt oS hakespeare. Andh es urelyd oes not want to say that this is duet ot he fact thatS hakespearel ived in an earlierp eriod,a period where this sort of conflict andr eflections of this kind were less common or unknown. He probably wantst op oint out that thiscomplex of ideas doesnot fit Shakespeare's physiognomy, as it were: hise ffortlessness anda rbitrariness ( §3.aa) as well as his uniquenessa nd hisb eing an elemental force,c reating" natural forms of language" ( §5.e), showt hat he simply is not cuto ut for the role of romantic poet. Andt he othera rchetypicalf unction often associatedw ithp oets, viz.t hat of prophet and teacher,i s equallyunsuitable forShakespeare.
Of course, both figures -the romantic poet as well as the prophetic one -arem erely schematicc haracters, almost caricatures. But they arer eadilyb rought in connectionw ith real people,p eople we like anda dmire or dislike and reject. Shakespeare, however,does notbelongtoany of these categoriesor thisiswhat Wittgensteins uggests. We maya dmire him, but our admiration will not be tingedw ithf eelingso ff ondness;a nd if our attitude is negative,itwillbelike ourresponse to astorm or aflood or amountain:personal feelingsjust do notcomeinto it.
By now, this sounds familiar,b ut there is an important feature highlighted by theser eflectionsw hichw eh aven ot noteds of ar (even thoughi tm ay have been present): Wittgenstein'sr eflections go beyond thew orkt ot he character of their author. This is not a biographicale ndeavour buta na ttempt at drawing ap icture of the type of person whoc ould have created these plays. Thise ffort in imaginative physiognomyispart of amore comprehensive effortto understand the authorc oncerneda sw ella sh is work and to understand each onei nt he light of theo ther.O nt he one hand, thisi sc onnectedw ith the idea thatt he author's whole oeuvre needs to be taken into account ( § §3.ab,4 .ab) . And, on theo ther hand,i ti sc onnectedw ith ac onsideration mentioned only now, namely, that for us to be able to appreciateanauthorweshall have to like his culture.I fw ed on ot find this culture attractive, we shall not be able to do justicet oh im; at most,a" cold admiration" will be possible (toq uote the textualv ariant,C V: 96). If we apply this important thought to the caseo fS hakespeare, it will not be necessary to draw Monk's sweeping conclusion and speak of "Wittgenstein'sd islike of Englishc ulture in general".I ti sm uch more likely that what Wittgenstein had in mind were the Elizabethan timeso r, perhaps,t his period of Europeanh istory more generally.A fter all, Wittgenstein'sp erspective is shaped by historical rather thannationalconsiderations.
Sketches as supreme art
Our last quotation( CV: 98)c omesf romm anuscript 174, most of which is reprintedi nL WI I( pp. 81-90) or OC ( § §66-192) .T he remarks we arei nterested in are againm arked by vertical strokes and were accordingly excluded from LW II but included in CV.
[a]Ich kann Shakespeare darum nichtverstehen,weilich in der gänzlichenAsymmetriedie Symmetriefindenwill.
The reason Icannotunderstand ShakespeareisthatIwant to find symmetryinall this asymmetry.
[b]Mir kommt vor, seine Stücke seien, gleichsam,enorme Skizzen, nichtGemälde; sie seien hingeworfen, voneinem, der sich sozusagen alles erlaubenkann.Und ichverstehe, wie mandas bewundernund es die höchste Kunst nennenkann, aberich mag es nicht. -Wer dahervor diesen Stücken sprachlos steht, denkannich verstehen; wersie aber bewundert,so wie manBeethoven etwa bewundert, derscheint mirShakespeare mißzuverstehen.
It seems to me as thoughhis pieces are, as it were,enormoussketches, notpaintings;asthoughthey were dashed offbysomeone who could permit himself anything,sotospeak. And Iunderstandhow someonemay admire this andcallitsupreme art,but Idon't likeit. -So Ican understand someone whostandsbefore those pieces speechless;but someone who admires him as oneadmires Beethoven, say, seems to me to misunderstand Shakespeare Ithink this much is clear:"asymmetry" stands for the "spectacleof nature", the "naturalf orms", theu ninhibited bird-likes inging associatedw ithS hakespeare and hisa rt by Wittgenstein. His inabilityt ou nderstand -and perhaps one should add, fully understand -Shakespeare is said to depend on his looking for the wrong thing. He approaches these works in aw ay which is bound to be inadequate.T ob es ure, he understands these works up to a point.H ec an, after all, tentatively describet he sort of thing you wouldh avet ob ea blet oa ppreciate in order to appreciate Shakespeare's art; he describesi ta ssketches rathert han paintings and adds that hed oes" understand hows omeone maya dmire this and call it supreme art". In Wittgenstein'sv iew, the problem seems to liei nt his: thati fthis counts as supreme art, then it wills tand in thew ay of appreciating otherf orms of art as equally admirable.I n otherw ords, Shakespearea nd Beethoven (to useW ittgenstein's example, cf. § 5.e) excludee ach other to ac ertain extent, and perhaps onem ay speak of ad egreeo fi ncommensurability.F rom this perspectiveo ne can see thatW ittgenstein's "I don'tl ike it" doesn ot simply amount to saying "This is not my cupo ft ea". What he wants to express is that,onaccountofhis true admiration for Beethoven( ands of orth), he is constitutionally incapable of mobilizingt he same standards of feeling and judgement when it comestoShakespeare.
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There is afurther point which is importantfrom Wittgenstein's perspective.I ti ss tatedi nt he next observation printed in CV: "Onea ge misunderstands another; andapetty age misunderstands all theo thers in itso wn ugly way."
20
Therec an be littled oubt that Wittgensteint hought of his ownt imes as a" small", or petty,a ge. Simply in virtue of living in this ageitwill be difficult or impossible for him to gain accesst oc ertain otherh istorical periods and their achievements. Sowemay perhaps take it that in Wittgenstein'seyes theh istoricald istance between Shakespeare's age andh is own 19 In speakingo fS hakespeareIh esitate to add "ands of orth" becauseo ft he fact that, according to Wittgenstein, Shakespeareisunique -alaw unto himself. And yet, there may be other people belonging to the class of "unique" or "absolutely original"p oets or artists,w ho would of course" exclude" each other in some ways but, as ac lass, stand in opposition to the class of poets sharing certain standards and ac ertains ensibility. A candidate whoisoftenmentioned by peoplewho hold views similar to thoseexpressedby Wittgenstein is Homer (cf. Schiller andAbrams,referred to below). 20 "EineZeit mißversteht die andere;u nd eine kleine Zeit mißversteht allea nderni ni hrer eigenenh äßlichenW eise" (MS1 74: 5v, separated from its context by vertical strokes; in the manuscript, thereare tworemarks between thisand the previous quotation, cf.LWII: 112). times is such thatf or hima nd his contemporaries it will prove particularly difficult, or almostimpossible,toapproach Shakespeare in aw ay which may have beeno pen to his contemporaries or people living in periods very differentfrom Wittgenstein's.Ifthis is roughly right, it woulda lso help to explainW ittgenstein's suspicious attitudetowards the majority of Shakespeareenthusiasts: if youlive in certaintimes, your admiration forthe works of certain otherp eriodsi su nlikely to be honest -especiallyi fy ou also express admirationfor certain other works (e.g.Beethoven).
IV.Concluding remarks
This surveyo fW ittgenstein's remarkso nShakespeare should contribute to ours eeing two things:( 1) Most of the points made are repeated in other contextso re choedi nasomewhat different register. So, by relying on thef eatures thus characterizedi ts hould not be too difficultt od raw ap icture outlining what Wittgenstein foundo fp articulari nterest in Shakespeare. (2)R eflectiono nt he picturedrawnbythese means andaglanceatthe literature will help us to understandt hat in variousw aysW ittgenstein's observations arefar from original. Thatis, onewould not really want to examine and discuss them in theh opeo fg aining newi nsightsi nto Shakespeare and hisw orks.S everalo ft he points made by Wittgenstein can be found in thec hapter "Literature as a Revelation of Personality" of Abrams'sb ook The Mirrora nd the Lamp (Abrams 1953:226-262 Id on ot wish to claim that Wittgensteink new this passage or that he was influenced by Schiller.All Iwanttosuggest is that there is a traditional way of looking at Shakespearel eading to similar results fort he simple reason that it is centredo nq uestions about the extent to which aw ork mirrors the character of itsa uthora nd to whichl ooking at the relationship between themc an help us to understand oneo rb oth of them.T he obviousm ottof or those inclined to follow this method is Buffon's "le style est l'homme même", which (as both Wittgensteina nd Abrams point out)i s often misquoted:
"Le style c'est l'homme." "Le style c'estl 'hommem ême." Thef irst expression hasacheap epigrammatic brevity. Thesecond, correct, one opens up aquite different perspective. It says that style is the picture of the man.
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As it happens, this remark was writtena ta lmostt he same time as our quotation §4, above.
What,t hen, is ther ealp oint of Wittgenstein'sr emarkso n Shakespeare? The answer is thatt heya re part of hisc onversations with himself:t hingsh es ays to himself tête-à-tête.
23
Foro ne thing, he pursues his strugglet og et clearera bouth imself, his own strengths andw eaknesses (especiallythe latter). In this context, his reflections on Shakespearepresent him with an exampleofawriter who is completely different from himself, perhaps even alien to himself. By wayo fc ontrast he comest ou nderstand more clearly thanb efore thath ew illh avet os ay what he intends to express in terms that are shaped by existing rulesa nd conventions.H em ay wish or feel then eedt of lout them, buti nh is caset hisw illn ever be the result of Shakespeare's or someo ther "naive" poet's daredevila ttitude; it will be done in recognition of the existenceo f those rules andconventions.Whateverhedoes, he cannot shedhis "good manners".
24
In thisr especth ew ill always resemble Mendelssohn;a tm ost,h ec an aspire to becomel ike Brahms, that is," Mendelssohn without thef laws"( CV: 18). Seen from this perspective, Beethoven is the(unreachable)i deal.T hat is,h ei st he ideal -the highest point -in thec ategory Wittgensteint akes himself to belongt o. Shakespeare, on the other hand,d oes not belong here at all. That is whyone cannot truly admire them both.
So,W ittgenstein's reflections area bout standardso fe xcellence. Thequestion is whether or not he himself is capable of doing firstclass work. Andh ea sks this question because, in hiso pinion,o nly first-class worki sr eallyw orth doing. From his point of view, it wouldbeterrible forhim if thefollowing statement provedtrue:
Ia mas econd-ratep oet. As ao ne-eyed man,t hough, Ia mak ing among the blind. Andfor asecond-ratepoetitwouldbebetter to give up writing poetry, even if in this respect he stands outa mong his fellowhuman beings.
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Some readers may wonderw hy he kept discussing theseq uestions ("tête-à-tête with himself") by making comparisonsw ith poets or composers, never with philosophers.
26
In aw ay,t he question contains its answer:t he standards Wittgensteinw ants to appeal to cannot be seen to be paradigmatically satisfied by ap hilosopher; theya re essentiallyb ound up withc ertain peoplea nd works mentionedb yh im.A nd it is important for himt hat this circle is defined by as mall and fairly well-circumscribedg roupo fp eople.
24 CV: 29 (MS157a:23v); cf.MS122: 88v; MS 162b: 36v. 25 MS 117: 193( 24.2.1940) : "Ich bine in zweitrangiger Dichter.W enn ich auch als Einäugiger Königu nterd en Blinden bin. Und einz weitrangiger Dichter täte besser daran, das Dichten aufzugeben. Auch wenn er damit unter seinen Mitmenschenh ervorragt." That Wittgenstein wast roubled by worries about his Zweitrangigkeit is reportedb yM iss Anscombe (1969) .Ithink that the details of her report are very instructive; her explanatoryremarks,however, seem unsatisfactory. Seealso Schulte(2013a) . 26 One might want to argue that Nietzsche is an exception.B ut of course Nietzsche's standingamong academic philosophers is very controversial, andmany would be happy to classify him as a"poet".
For reasons we have seen, Shakespeare is emphatically denied membership in this group.
